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The most important contractual right that shareholders have is widely taken to be
their right to vote on important corporate matters (Manne, 1964; Easterbrook and
Fischel, 1983). That provided, the question arises how voting rights should be allo-
cated among shareholders. At rst glance, it seems natural that shareholders who
supply equal amounts of capital or hold equal claims should have equal opportunity
to inuence decisions. However, the so-called one share - one vote principle is often
violated in reality. More than one third of the 300 largest European companies in
2005 deviated from the principle (Deminor Rating, 2005). In North America, such
deviations are less frequent but still common. The fraction of listed rms with
dual-class shares is about 6 percent in the US and about 22 percent on the Toronto
Stock Exchange (Gompers et al., 2007; Chemmanur and Jiao, 2006).1
Corporate voting practices have varied over time as much as they vary across
countries today. In Ancient Rome, so-called publicani issued shares with di¤erent
voting rights to the wealthy and to the wider public (Chancellor, 1999). During
the Middle Ages, the common practice in Europe evolved from a one member - one
vote standard to a variety of disproportional voting structures, some favouring small
or medium-sized shareholders, others enhancing the control of large shareholders
(Dunlavy, 1998; Pistor et al., 2003). Early US practices typically limited the voting
power of individual shareholders but by the beginning of the twentieth century
rms empowered dominant shareholders by selling non-voting shares to smaller
shareholders (Manne, 1964). Following the uprise against Big Business, the NYSE
disallowed in 1926 the listing of rms with non-voting stock (Seligman, 1986).
Both in the US and in Europe, issues of inferior voting stock then became rather
uncommon until the latter half of the 20th century when their (re-)appearance
often concurred with takeover waves (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1988; Rydqvist, 1992).
In 1986, the NYSE abandoned the one share - one vote requirement bowing to
competitive pressure from the Amex and NASDAQ, both of which admitted rms
1Other nancing arrangements with unequal voting rights among providers of equity capital
include private equity and hedge funds. These funds are typically run by general partners, while
limited partners have no voting power and are solely protected by covenants and a limited invest-
ment period. Similarly, contracts between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs typically allocate
cash ow rights separately from voting rights (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003).
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with multiple share classes. A number of European countries concurrently changed
their laws to accommodate deviations (Arruñada and Paz-Ares, 1995), but more
recently the trend has reversed again. European regulation is by and large becoming
more restrictive, and the frequency of deviations is gradually decreasing towards
the US level (Goergen et al., 2005; Pajuste, 2005). Moreover, di¤erences at the
national level fuel the ongoing debate about a EU-wide prohibition of deviations, a
policy issue intimately related to takeover regulation (Ferrarini, 2006) and the call
for stronger shareholder rights (Deminor Rating, 2005).
At the most basic level, the allocation of voting rights across shares, hence-
forth the security-voting structure, matters because it determines the balance of
power among shareholders as well as their leverage over management. As such, it
shapes the governance mechanisms that rely on active owners and control trans-
fers, thereby inuencing how e¢ ciently rms are run.2 Proponents of one share -
one vote argue that it is most conducive to good governance. In particular, one
share - one vote makes for a level playing eld in takeover contests, which ensures
that control is allocated to the most e¢ cient party. Moreover, it aligns voting
power and economic incentives, which makes blockholders more prone to pursue
value-maximizing actions.
This paper examines whether or to what extent the theoretical literature sub-
stantiates the optimality of one share - one vote. (Adams and Ferreira (2007)
provide a survey of the empirical literature on the one share - one vote principle.)
We organize the extant literature around three broad questions: First, what impact
does the security-voting structure have on takeovers? Second, how does it inuence
the incentives of blockholders during the normal course of business? Third, how
does the one share - one vote rule a¤ect rmschoice of ownership and nancing?
In our reading of the theory, the answers to these questions raise doubts whether
one share - one vote consistently outperforms other (dual-class) structures with re-
spect to promoting e¢ cient control allocation and mitigating agency problems.
First, takeover models show that one share - one vote is most conducive to a so-
2Other important governance mechanisms are the nancial structure, executive compensation,
the board of directors, product market competition and legal investor protection (Becht et al.,
2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). As the e¤ectiveness of these mechanisms varies across rms and
countries, the importance and prevalence of active owners and takeovers depends on the respective
governance system (Allen and Gale, 2000).
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cially optimal control allocation in some instances but not in others. In widely
held rms, one share - one vote is optimal only when several bidders compete,
as it ensures that the most e¢ cient bidder gains control. By contrast, dual-class
structures mitigate the free-rider problem in widely held rms and hence promote
takeover activity in case of a single bidder. In rms with controlling shareholders,
one share - one vote is optimal, as it minimizes the ine¢ ciencies in negotiated con-
trol sales. However, controlling owners may prefer dual-class structures to extract
higher takeover premia from acquirers, even though this increases the risk of an
ine¢ cient control allocation. Therefore, one share - one vote could be advocated on
the grounds that it improves the control allocation in rms with controlling minor-
ity shareholders, not least because many dual-class rms have such an ownership
structure.
Second, blockholder models show that deviations from one share - one vote come
with costs as well as benets. Leveraging a blockholders voting power improves
her ability to monitor and intervene in management on behalf of all shareholders.
At the same time, it enables her to take self-serving actions, such as diverting
corporate resources for less productive private purposes. Similarly, concentrated
voting power insulates corporate insiders from the disciplining e¤ect of the market
for corporate control. However, it also avoids undesirable responses to contestable
control, such as value-decreasing actions to fend o¤ takeovers (entrenchment).
Third, mandating one share - one vote may have adverse e¤ects on rmschoice
of nancing and ownership structure as well as their growth. On the one hand,
entrepreneurs may eschew public equity markets for fear of losing control. Instead,
they may resort to inferior forms of nancing or simply forgo valuable investment
projects. On the other hand, mandating one share - one vote may discourage
blockownership. It forces dominant shareholders to increase their equity stake or
to accept having less inuence. Either option may be less attractive than dissolving
the entire block. While this would mitigate the conict among shareholders, it also
strengthens the position of managers, thereby aggravating the shareholder-manager
conict. That is, if blockholders can expropriate (minority) shareholders, so can
presumably professional managers.
Hence, the central question is whether entrenched owners or contestable man-
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agers are more prone to run rms e¢ ciently. Large ownersincentives to maximize
value stem from their large equity stake, but they are rather immune to hostile
takeovers. Professional managers, on the contrary, are more exposed to hostile
takeovers but also have less nancial interests. This seems to be a fundamental
dilemma not only in the one share - one vote debate but in corporate governance
generally (Becht et al., 2003). Thus, any policy that weakens blockholders must be
based on the condence that managers are at least as well disciplined by other gov-
ernance mechanisms, such as legal protection, strong boards or a well-functioning
takeover market (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
In addition, mandating one share - one vote confronts policy-makers and reg-
ulators with considerable implementation problems, irrespective of its desirability.
Active owners may resort to other means of separating ownership and control, such
as pyramids or derivative transactions. As a result, implementing proportional-
ity remains either partial, restricted to specic deviation devices, or requires more
far-reaching changes in stock market regulations, disclosure rules or intercorporate
taxation.
In our analysis, we use the simple dual-class structure with voting and non-
voting shares, both entitled to the same (pro-rata) dividends, as the representative
means to separate cash ow and voting rights.3 The derived insights also extend
to multi-class structures, pyramids or cross-ownerships. The reason is that any
control and cash ow allocation, notably controlling minority structures, achiev-
able through these structures can be replicated by the simple dual-class structure
(Bebchuk et al., 2000). This does not hold for lock-in mechanismssuch as vot-
ing and ownership ceilings, priority shares, depositary certicates, and the French
system of double voting shares, which we discuss separately. The verdict for these
mechanisms is less ambiguous, since they insulate managers from both takeovers
and e¤ective shareholder monitoring.
The survey proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines the impact of the security-
voting structure on tender o¤ers and negotiated control sales. Section 3 analyzes
3 In practice, dual-class structures may comprise a superior class with multiple votes per share
as in e.g., Sweden, or non-voting shares with or without preferential dividends as in e.g., Germany
and Italy. National regulations usually impose a minimum ratio of votes per inferior share to
votes per superior share, e.g., 1/10, or some minimum proportion of voting shares e.g., 50 percent
(Rydqvist, 1992).
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how the security-voting structure inuences the e¤ectiveness of blockownership as
a governance mechanism. Section 4 explores how restricting the choice of security-
voting structure may a¤ect rmsnancing and ownership decisions. It also dis-
cusses the di¢ culties of implementing the one share - one vote rule and minority
shareholder protection as a rationale for regulation. Section 5 describes lock-in
mechanisms and their e¤ects. Section 6 concludes the theoretical survey.
2. Control Transfers and Security-Voting Structure
A well-functioning takeover market subjects rms to a continuous auction process.
In principle, rms should therefore be ultimately owned and managed by those
who maximize their value (Manne, 1965; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). However,
the theoretical literature identies various reasons that impair an ex-post e¢ cient
control allocation, notably incentive and coordination problems inherent in the
takeover process.4 Our concern is whether dual-class share structures mitigate or
exacerbate these frictions.
Much of the takeover literature, including the strand on security-voting struc-
ture, presupposes a publicly listed target rm with dispersed ownership and freely
tradeable shares. Indeed, dispersedly held dual-class rms are by no means un-
usual. In a comprehensive sample of US dual-class rms between 1997 and 2002
collected by Gompers et al. (2007), corporate insiders do not own the vote majority
in about a third of the observations. In the sample of Pajuste (2005), which covers
493 dual-class rms from seven European countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Italy, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) during 1996 to 2002, the two largest share-
holders own together less than 20 percent of the votes in about a quarter of the
rms.5 Nevertheless, many listed companies, outside the UK and US, have a large
4There are several reviews of the takeover literature, including Andrade et al. (2001), Bhagat
et al. (1990), Becht et al. (2003), Bruner (2002), Burkart and Panunzi (2006), Holmström and
Kaplan (2001), Hirshleifer (1995), Jensen (1988), McCahery et al. (2004), Scherer (1988) and von
Thadden (1990).
5 In the sample of Bennedsen and Nielsen (2004), ultimate control is dispersed in about 57
percent of 1035 European dual-class rms, i.e., no group that comprises every ultimate owner
with at least 5 percent of the votes holds collectively the majority. For the 500 largest rms,
this gure is above 67 percent. However, these gures are likely to overestimate the incidence of
dispersed control, as ultimate control in this sample is measured by the weakest link along the
control chain. For instance, if a family owns 20 percent of rm A, which in turn owns 50 percent
of rm B, then this family is said to ultimately control 20 percent of rm B (Faccio and Lang,
2002).
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shareholder (La Porta et al., 1999; Barca and Becht, 2001; Claessens et al., 2000;
Faccio and Lang, 2002). Moreover, these rms are more prone to use dual-class
shares. We therefore examine the role of the security-voting structure for both
dispersedly held rms and rms with a controlling shareholder.
2.1. TENDER OFFERS
In a typical tender o¤er, the acquiring rm, henceforth the bidder, o¤ers to
purchase the shares of dispersed shareholders for cash or in exchange for other
securities. If a majority of shares is tendered, the bidder gains control over the
target rm. In this section, we presuppose that such a public tender o¤er is feasible.
In particular, we assume that there are neither restrictions on the accumulation
of shares or votes, nor priority shares endowed with veto power, nor controlling
shareholders.
Our analysis of the tender o¤er process considers a widely held target rm
that is approached by a bidder who does not own any shares prior to the o¤er.
The rm has a dual-class share structure with nv 2 f1; :::ng voting shares, the
remaining (n nv) shares being non-voting. (For nv = n, the dual-class structure is
reduced to one share - one vote.) If the incumbent management remains in control,
shareholders obtain security benets xI per share, while the bidder is known to
generate security benets xB per share once she is in control.
To gain control, the bidder submits an unrestricted o¤er, conditional on getting
at least 50 percent of the voting shares. If the rm has a dual-class structure
(nv 6= n), the bidder may quote di¤erent prices for voting and non-voting shares.
However, if she submits a price for a certain share class, she has to buy all tendered
shares from that class, conditional upon a control transfer.6 In the models reviewed
below, discriminating between share classes is part of the optimal bidding strategy.
Bidders make an o¤er only for voting shares because non-voting shares are of no
use in gaining control and cannot be purchased at a price below the (expected)
post-takeover value.
6The assumption that a bid has to be unrestricted for a given class is not crucial, as one can
easily replicate the analysis of intra-class restricted bids by redening nv. For example, restricted
o¤ers for half of the voting shares amounts to n0v = nv=2. Indeed, the analysis of restricted
vs. unrestricted bids is analogous to that of single-class vs. dual-class structures (Bergström et al.,
1997).
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To succeed, a bidder must not only win the approval of a majority of the
shareholders (owning voting shares) but also outbid any competing o¤er. The
takeover outcome (bid price) and hence the impact of the security-voting structure
depends on which of the two constraints binds. Hence, we consider the cases of a
single bidder and of bidding competition in turn.
2.1.1. Single Bidder
Grossman and Hart (1980a) and Bradley (1980) show that the market for cor-
porate control may not function e¢ ciently when shares are dispersedly held. We
briey review their argument as it is central to the understanding of how the
security-voting structure a¤ects the target shareholderstendering decision.
Free-rider problem Suppose the target rm has only voting shares (nv = n)
held by a very large number of shareholders such that each perceives her tendering
decision as negligible for the takeover outcome.7 When deciding to accept an o¤er
with a (per share) price p, each shareholder compares the benets and costs of
tendering in case of success and failure. If the bid fails, the o¤er becomes void
and the choice is irrelevant. If the o¤er succeeds, the shareholder gets the bid
price p when tendering and the post-takeover security benets xB when retaining
her share. Thus, for any price below the post-takeover security benets, each
shareholder prefers not to tender. As all shareholders behave in the same manner,
the lowest price at which the bidder can succeed is p = xB. At this price the bidder
makes no prot on the shares purchased in the tender o¤er. If the bidder incurs
some cost K in making the bid, the takeover will not take place even if it is e¢ cient
(n
 
xB   xI > K). Thus, value-increasing takeovers of dispersedly held rms may
fail.
The theoretical literature suggests several ways how the bidder may (partially)
overcome the free-rider problem. Allowing a successful bidder to withhold part of
the post-takeover rm value from the (remaining) minority shareholders enables
her to make a prot (Grossman and Hart, 1980a). Suppose the successful bidder
could pay other shareholders only (1  )xB of the dividends (per share) that she
7Strictly speaking, this requires an innite number of shareholders (n = 1). To ease the
exposition, we abstract from such technical details.
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collects. Such dilution of the minority shareholdersreturn rights drives a wedge
between the post-takeover share value for the bidder and that for the minority
shareholders. As a result, shareholders accept any price p  (1   )xB and the
bidder can make a prot if nxB > K.
An alternative solution is the acquisition of a stake prior to the tender o¤er
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986b; Chowdhry and Jegadeesh, 1994). Suppose the bidder
already owns nB < n of the shares. Even if she cannot dilute the minority share-
holderssecurity benets and consequently has to o¤er p = xB, she may prot from
a bid. This is because she appropriates the value improvement of her initial stake,
nB(xB   xI), which may be large enough to cover the takeover cost.8 Notwith-
standing such devices, it still holds true that the free-riding behavior precludes
bidders from earning a prot on the shares purchased in the tender o¤er. Hence,
the prot prospects of would-be acquirers remain limited and too few takeovers are
undertaken, as posited by Grossman and Hart (1980a) and Bradley (1980).
While bidder gains promote takeovers, they need not ensure an e¢ cient control
allocation. In particular, dispersed shareholders may also fail to reject a value-
decreasing bid (Bebchuk, 1985, 1988). Suppose that the bidder generates private
benets ZB but overall decreases value (nxB + ZB < nxI). If the bidder o¤ers
a price p > xB, shareholders face the so-called pressure-to-tender problem: A
shareholder who believes the bid to succeed prefers to sell at the price p to avoid
being in the less favorable minority position with security benets xB. If she
believes the bid to fail, the choice is again irrelevant. Thus, tendering can be
individually rational for a shareholder, and the bidder can prot from such a bid
provided that ZB > K.
In the standard free-rider setting, the security-voting structure does not matter
for the takeover outcome or shareholder wealth. This holds equally true for value-
increasing and value-decreasing bids. Suppose that there are nv < n voting shares
and the bidder makes an o¤er for these shares only. As before, she must o¤er
p = xB to induce voting shareholders to tender, and hence she makes no prot on
the voting shares. In fact, it is immaterial how many shares the bidder must buy to
8Other ways to overcome the free-rider problem include making the bid conditional on the
squeeze-out threshold (Yarrow, 1985; Amihud et al., 2003) or debt-nancing (Mueller and Panunzi,
2004).
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gain control. Likewise, shareholders are indi¤erent between voting and non-voting
shares, as they receive xB in either case.
A prerequisite for this irrelevance result is that the (actual or perceived) rm
value after the takeover is independent of the security-voting structure. This is no
longer true when the rm value under the bidder is private information or depends
on the bidders nal equity stake.
Asymmetric Information Even when bidders have superior information about
their ability to generate security benets, they cannot purchase shares in the tender
o¤er at a price below the average post-takeover security benets. Target share-
holders retain their shares unless the o¤er price at least matches the expected
post-takeover security benets (x^B). Thus, the free-rider problem remains under
asymmetric information (Hirshleifer, 1995).
However, in the presence of asymmetric information, the security-voting struc-
ture a¤ects the takeover outcome. As shown by At et al. (2007), this happens
because the equality p = xB does not hold for each individual bidder type. In-
stead, the bid price is fair (p = x^B), but some types pay more and others less than
their respective post-takeover security benets. More non-voting shares reduce the
fraction of return rights that bidders purchase and therefore render a bid ceteris
paribus more protable for types who pay more than their post-takeover security
benets. Hence, some formerly frustrated types can now earn a prot and make
a bid. In response, shareholders revise their beliefs about the post-takeover share
value downward. This in turn lowers the bid price at which shareholders are willing
to tender and makes the takeover protable for further types.
By means of illustration, consider a target with nv 6 n voting shares and a
bidder that can improve share value either to xH or to xL with equal probability,
where xH > xL > xI . In addition, let the bidders private benets increase with her
security benets, i.e., ZH > ZL. If dispersed shareholders believe a given o¤er p to
be independent of the bidders type (xH or xL), they will not tender unless p at least
matches the average post-takeover security benets x^B = (xH + xL)=2. A pooling
equilibrium (with p = x^B), in which both bidder types succeed, exists only if the low
type at least breaks even, ZL+(xL x^B)nv > K. This participation constraint may
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not hold, even if her private benets are su¢ cient to cover the takeover cost, ZL >
K. She incurs a loss of (xL x^B)nv on the purchased shares, which may well exceed
her private benets net of takeover cost. Suppose her participation constraint is
violated under one share - one vote (nv = n). By reducing the number of voting
shares and hence the purchase loss, the pooling equilibrium can be achieved. In
this case, dual-class shares promote desirable takeovers by reducing an overvalued
bidders cost of purchasing control. If, by contrast, xH > xI > xL, one share - one
vote is optimal because it deters the undesirable bid.
This simple example illustrates the two main insights of At et al. (2007). First,
non-voting shares mitigate the free-rider problem when shareholders do not know
the bidders ability to generate value.9 Second, the security-voting structure can
be chosen to discriminate among bidders, that is, to encourage all and only value-
increasing bids. In At et al. (2007), this optimal structure typically deviates from
one share - one vote, and the optimal number of voting shares increases with the
share value under the incumbent. The result implies that low-value rms should
have dual-class structures, thereby encouraging more bids.
Endogenous Private Benets Grossman and Hart (1980a), like many sub-
sequent takeover models, (implicitly) assume that private benets and security
benets are independent of the bidders nal cash ow stake. To succeed, the
bidder must o¤er a price equal to the post-takeover security benets and she un-
dertakes the bid if her private benets are su¢ cient to cover the takeover cost
(ZB > K). Since the security-voting structure a¤ects neither the security nor the
private benets, it has no impact on the bid price or the takeover incidence.
In Burkart et al. (1998), the security-voting structure matters because private
benet extraction is, by assumption, ine¢ cient and exhibits decreasing marginal
returns. When the bidder owns more cash ow rights, she internalizes more of
this ine¢ ciency and therefore extracts less private benets, which implies higher
post-takeover security benets. Due to the free-rider behavior, the bidder does
not make any prot on the tendered shares, and the private benets constitute
9These results - like others in this literature - are sensitive to the assumed relationship between
security and private benets. For instance, more voting shares promote takeover activity when
security benets and private benets are inversely related. But even in this case one share - one
vote need not be optimal, as it may encourage too many value-decreasing bids.
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her only prot. Since non-voting shares reduce the number of cash ow rights
that a bidder has to purchase to gain control, more non-voting shares increase the
private benets that she will extract, and therefore make the bid more protable.
Thus, more private benet extraction is a benet rather than a cost of dual-class
structures as it promotes takeovers of dispersedly held rms.
By means of illustration, consider a target with nv 6 n voting shares and a
bidder who can improve the total value of the rm to vB > vI per share, with vI
normalized to 0. When in control, she can extract private benets of ZB at the
expense of reducing security benets from vB to vB  ZB=n . Suppose  > 0 so
that private benet extraction dissipates value. That is, the loss in security benets
in this case exceeds the private gains to the bidder. Consequently, there exists a
n < n such that the bidder will only extract private benets if she has acquired
no more than n shares in the takeover. At the same time, she must acquire a
majority of the voting shares to gain control. Hence, when nv=2 > n, there exists
no takeover strategy that ensures both success and private benets. Given that dis-
persed target shareholders fully appropriate the increase in security benets, the
takeover fails. In this setting, reducing the number of voting shares can therefore
promote takeovers by increasing the bidders post-takeover incentive to extract pri-
vate benets. Thus, the empirical predictions are that deviations promote takeover
activity and reduce takeover premia in the absence of competition.10
Social vs. Private Optimality The above extensions of the standard single-
bidder tender o¤er framework both nd that deviations from one share - one
vote mitigate the free-rider problem in dispersedly held rms. To the extent that
takeovers should be promoted, deviations may thus be socially e¢ cient. Similarly,
regulations or corporate charter provisions that compel bidders to purchase all
shares, like the mandatory bid rule or the so-called coattail provision11, replicate
the e¤ect of the one share - one vote structure and may therefore frustrate too
many value-increasing takeovers.
10Gromb (1992) derives the same predictions in a model with a nite number of shareholders,
each of whom perceives herself as pivotal with some positive probability. In addition, his model
predicts that voting shares should trade at a discount relative to non-voting shares, which is rarely
observed (Lease et al., 1983, 1984).
11The coattail provision obliges bidders to extend an o¤er to all share classes on the same terms.
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The socially optimal structure di¤ers in general from the privately preferred
one, because target shareholders abstract from takeover costs but not from the
distribution of takeover gains. This divergence is simple to illustrate: Since the
free-rider condition equates the bid price to the security benets under the bidder,
shareholders want a takeover to succeed whenever xB > xI . From a social perspec-
tive, takeovers should not succeed unless nxB+ZB K > nxI +ZI . Clearly, these
two conditions need not coincide.
In general, shareholders may both stray too far or not far enough from one
share - one vote. A privately optimal structure which abstracts from takeover costs
tends to encourage too many takeovers relative to the social optimum. By contrast,
a structure aimed at extracting much of the takeover gains tends to deter too many
bids. Hence, whether the shareholderspreferred structure encourages too many
or too few takeovers depends on which of the two e¤ects dominates. For instance,
only the rst e¤ect is present in the model of At et al. (2007), whereas in a model
with endogenous private benet extraction shareholders choose too many voting
shares to increase both bid price and post-takeover security benets.
The divergence undermines the common view that owners who take a rm pub-
lic choose the socially optimal charter provisions because they are residual claimants
and therefore fully internalize the costs and benets of their decisions (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). The aw in the argument is that initial negotiations cannot fea-
sibly include all parties that contribute in the future to the value of the rm, such
as the bidder in the present context. Hence, initial owners and shareholders agree
to deviate from the e¢ cient structure to improve the (shareholders) bargaining
position vis-à-vis future bidders (Bebchuk and Zingales, 2000).
2.1.2. Bidding Contest
Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988) provide the rst formal
analyses of the role of the security-voting structure in takeovers. In essence, they
presume bidding contests, in which an outside bidder B competes against, say,
the incumbent I. (The rival could equally well be another outside bidder). For
simplicity, neither B nor I own an initial stake in the rm, and there are no
takeover costs (K = 0). The security benets generated by I and B are xB and
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xI per share and their (total) private benets are ZB and ZI . At the time of the
bidding contest, these characteristics are known to the shareholders. The target
rm has n outstanding shares which all carry the same security benets but of
which only nv carry a vote.
We assume that competition is e¤ective in the sense that the losing competi-
tors willingness-to-pay determines the bid price. That is, the winning bid price is
larger than the security benets generated by the winner. Otherwise, the takeover
outcome would be determined by the shareholders tendering decision, in which
case the results from the single-bidder section apply. Finally, we assume that B










Hence, the e¢ cient outcome is that B wins the control contest, and the key question
is which security-voting structures ensure this outcome.
Reservation Prices and Control Premium Given that competition is e¤ec-
tive, the bid price exceeds by denition the winners security benets. Conse-
quently, either party submits an o¤er for the voting shares only, and the winning
bid will attract all nv voting shares. Anticipating this, B and I are willing to o¤er
at most nvxB +ZB and nvxI +ZI respectively. Dividing these terms by nv yields
the prices that they are prepared to pay per voting share, i.e. their reservation











Each party is prepared to pay a control premium (Z=nv) in excess of her security
benets because control confers private benets. Crucially, the control premium
increases as the number of voting shares decreases, whereas the security benets
per share remain constant. Thus, dual-class structures give more weight to private
benets in determining the winner of the contest, which can in turn lead to an
ine¢ cient control allocation.
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When B has larger private benets, she wins the contest irrespective of nv.
This is trivial if B has both higher security and higher private benets (xB > xI ,
ZB > ZI). It also holds when B has lower security benets but higher private
benets (xB 6 xI , ZB > ZI). To see this, note that, if ZB > ZI , (1) implies (2)
for any nv 6 n. Thus, the security-voting structure is irrelevant for the outcome
whenever the more e¢ cient party has also larger private benets. For instance, this
is always the case when private benets are positively related to security benets.
In the reverse case (ZB < ZI), only the one share - one vote structure (nv =
n) always ensures the e¢ cient outcome as (2) then coincides with the e¢ ciency
condition (1). By contrast, a dual-class structure can lead to an ine¢ cient outcome.
When nv is su¢ ciently low, I may have a higher reservation price than B and win
the contest, even though she creates a lower total rm value. The ine¢ ciency
arises because voting shareholders ignore the potential loss incurred by non-voting
shareholders. Hence, if the non-voting shareholders could coordinate themselves,
they could negotiate the e¢ cient outcome by compensating the voting shareholders
for any foregone control premium.
Social vs. Private Optimality When there is more than one bidder, one share -
one vote is socially optimal as it ensures that the e¢ cient bidder wins the contest.12
At the same time, it need not be in the shareholdersbest interest. As pointed out
by Grossman and Hart (1988), dual-class structures allow shareholders to extract a
higher control premium.13 This can easily be illustrated for the case when xB > xI
and ZB > ZI . In this constellation, B always wins and pays Is reservation price.




, decreases in nv, fewer voting shares
increase the price B will have to o¤er to outbid I. That is, deviations make the
losing bidder a more aggressive competitor, thereby forcing the winning bidder to
o¤er a higher price.
The optimal deviation from the shareholdersperspective is the one that ex-
tracts the highest possible bid price while still ensuring that the most e¢ cient
12While the latter statement also holds true in the setting with ine¢ cient private benet ex-
traction (Burkart et al., 1998), one share - one vote need not be socially optimal. Non-voting
shares intensify competition and force the winning party to acquire more cash ow rights, thereby
reducing ine¢ cient private benet extraction.
13Bergström et al. (1997) and Cornelli and Felli (2000) revisit this e¤ect in the context of the
mandatory bid rule and the sale of a bankrupt rm.
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bidder wins the contest. However, when the security-voting structure is chosen
before bidder characteristics are known, deviations come with the risk that the less
e¢ cient bidder wins. Even so, Sercu and Vinaimont (2006) show through simula-
tions that one share - one vote seldom maximizes ex ante shareholder wealth, that
is, shareholders often prefer dual-class shares. Thus, the model of Grossman and
Hart (1988) predicts that, all else equal, widely held dual-class shares entail higher
bid premia (for voting shares) in bidding contests and, if chosen in the shareholders
interest, higher total market values.14
From a normative perspective, this model suggests that one share - one vote
should be mandated, as it is socially optimal but unlikely to be chosen by share-
holders. The social optimality of one share - one vote conicts with the result
obtained in the case of a single bidder. We will discuss this discrepancy at the end
of this section.
Toeholds and Bidding Competition Pre-takeover stakes do not alter the out-
come of the bidding competition under full information. Suppose B bids pB and
consider the optimal response of I who owns a fraction i < 0:5 of the voting
shares. She prefers to counterbid rather than to sell her shares at this price if
nvx
I   (1   I)nvpB + ZI > InvpB, or equivalently, xI + (ZI=nv) > pB. The
left-hand side of the latter inequality is precisely the amount I is willing to pay
when owning no toehold. That is, the cost reduction of not having to buy her
own toehold is o¤set by the forgone revenues (opportunity cost) of not selling her
toehold to B.
Since toeholds a¤ect neither bidders reservation price and the bidder with
the higher reservation price wins, toeholds do not a¤ect the control allocation.
Consequently, one share - one vote continues to be socially optimal in the presence
of toeholds. It ensures that the e¢ cient bidder and the bidder with the highest
reservation price coincide.
The actual outcome, in terms of the winning price, depends on the extensive
form game, notably whether each bidder makes a single bid or can revise her bid.
If bid revisions are not precluded, the eventual bid price extracts the winning bid-
14To the best of our knowledge, there is no systematic study of takeover premia in widely held
dual-class rms.
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ders entire surplus. Anticipating that the higher valuation bidder will counterbid
until her reservation price is reached, the lower valuation bidder has an incentive
to bid more than her reservation price to raise the price at which she sells her
toehold. As a result, the entire takeover gains accrue to the tendering shareholders
who therefore have no reason to deviate from one share - one vote. The surplus
extraction is achieved by the overbidding of the losing bidder with a toehold.15
This suggests that rms with minority blockowners need not necessarily resort to
dual-class structures to drive up takeover premia.
The theoretical analysis of tender o¤ers shows that target shareholders prefer
ine¢ cient structures. Thus, there is scope for regulation. Unfortunately, the so-
cially optimal structure in case of bidding competition di¤ers from the one in case
of a single bidder. This precludes a clear-cut policy recommendation, unless one
case were empirically much more relevant than the other.
However, while proponents of one share - one vote (implicitly) look to the
competition case, the single-bidder setting seems empirically equally important.
For instance, Betton and Eckbo (2000) report that, among all US tender o¤er
contests between 1971 and 1990, 62 percent involved only one bid. This observation
alone does not imply that shareholder approval was the binding constraint in all
these cases. Instead, the single bid may have been set to preempt potential rivals.
Stronger support for the empirical relevance of the single-bidder setting can be
found in the fact that 22 percent of these bids failed. Furthermore, in 41 percent of
all multi-bid contests, all bids were made by the same bidder, and only very few of
these bid revisions were, according to the authors, related to rumored competition.
In conclusion, the claim that mandating one share - one vote or any other
structure will improve the control allocation of widely held rms must be qual-
ied. Unless policy-makers can observe the takeover environment of a given rm,
regulatory intervention could even do more harm than good.
15When the reservation prices are privately observed, the incentives to overbid may result in an
ine¢ cient control allocation (Burkart, 1995). The security-voting structure remains irrelevant, as
changes in the fraction of voting shares simply scale each bidders maximization problem, leaving
the optimal bids una¤ected.
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2.2. NEGOTIATED CONTROL TRANSFERS
The preceding analysis of the tender o¤er process presumes an ownership struc-
ture where (at least) the majority of votes is dispersedly held. By contrast, many
dual-class rms have a controlling minority shareholder, who is pivotal for the
takeover outcome. That is, a control transfer can only take place with her consent
and is therefore best viewed as the outcome of a bilateral negotiation between her
and the potential acquirer. Unlike in the case of widely held rms, existing the-
ory unequivocally suggests that one share - one vote is the (constrained) optimal
security-voting structure. As we show below, the logic behind this result is the
same as in the case of bidding competition.
Drawing on Kahan (1993) and Bebchuk (1994), we consider a rm run by a
controlling shareholder I who owns a fraction  > 0:5 of the voting shares. The
remaining (1 )nv voting shares and the (n nv) non-voting shares are dispersed
among small shareholders. The controlling shareholder is approached by an outside
bidder B who would like to take control. We assume that both partiesknow each
othersreservation prices, that is, the parameters xB, xI , ZB and ZI are known.
Hence, I and B will agree on a control transfers if it is mutually benecial. This
situation is very similar to a bidding contest between B and I, and the party that
values control more highly will eventually gain (keep) it.
A control transfer is e¢ cient if xB+(ZB=n) > xI+(ZI=n), that is, if condition
(1) holds. The value of the controlling block to I is nvxI + ZI , while B values
the block with nvxB +ZB. Abstracting from takeover costs, the two parties nd
it mutually benecial to trade if Bs reservation price (per block share) is higher
than that of I:
xB + (ZB=nv) > xI + (ZI=nv). (3)
How controlling shareholder and bidder share this surplus determines the block
price. Since the subsequent arguments do not depend on a specic block price,
we abstract from its determination.16 Once in control, the bidder has the option
16 In the theoretical literature, the block price is typically the outcome of a bargaining game
between incumbent and bidder that depends on the partiesoutside options (see e.g., Burkart et
al., 2000).
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to purchase the remaining voting and non-voting shares. Due to the free-rider
behavior, the small shareholders are not willing to tender their share for less than
the security benets xB. Hence, the bidder would not make a prot and abstains
from purchasing the remaining shares.
Condition (3) is almost identical to condition (2), the di¤erence being that
the control sale involves only the fraction  of voting shares. But this di¤erence
matters. While one share - one vote ensured an e¢ cient takeover outcome in
bidding contests, this is no longer true in a control sale. Even though the corporate
charter endows all shares with a vote, the presence of a control block turns all
minority shares into de facto non-voting shares. As a result, (3) and (1) diverge
even for n = nv, unless  = 1.
Ine¢ cient Control Allocation Controlling blocks may ultimately not be owned
by the more e¢ cient party for the same reason as dual-class share structures can
lead to an ine¢ cient bidding outcome. Suppose that B generates more value but
enjoys relatively small private benets. If  is su¢ ciently small, Bs reservation
price may be lower than that of I. The reason is that I attaches a high control
value to each share when she owns few. Consequently, she demands a price that B
may not be willing to pay, and a value-increasing control transfer may fail.
As in the competition case, the roles can be reversed. Suppose that B generates
less value but enjoys larger private benets. Now Bs reservation price may exceed
Is if  is su¢ ciently small. Thus, a value-decreasing control transfer may occur
because B is willing to pay I a very high control premium.
These ine¢ ciencies arise because I and B do not internalize the e¤ect of the
control transfer on the minority shareholders, just as the voting shareholders ig-
nored the welfare of the non-voting shareholders in the bidding contest. Again, the
ine¢ ciencies could be avoided if the minority shareholders were able to coordinate
and compensate I or B for taking the e¢ cient decision.
As in the competition case, an ine¢ cient outcome is more likely to materialize
when the fraction of voting shares is smaller. Increasing the number of shares that
the controlling shareholder must hold reduces the control premium per share and
thus the potential divergence between the ranking of reservation prices and the
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ranking of total rm values. For given , one share - one vote thus leads to the
second-best control allocation, minimizing both the failure of value-increasing bids
and the success of value-decreasing bids.
Social vs. Private Optimality Zingales (1995a) shows that oating some shares
can increase the total proceeds from selling a rm. By selling shares to dispersed
investors who have no choice but to free-ride in the subsequent control sale,
the owner can extract part of the surplus, without having to bargain over it.17
Dual-class shares allow to oat more shares (cash ow rights), while maintaining
control. Moreover, the control premium (per share) increases, as fewer shares are
involved in the control sale. Thus, dual-class share structures help to extract more
surplus from the bidder, for essentially the same reason as in the competition case.
The owner may therefore reduce the number of voting shares even if this increases
the risk of an ine¢ cient control allocation (Bebchuk and Zingales, 2000). Thus, a
mandatory one share - one vote rule can, as in the case of bidding competition,
improve overall e¢ ciency.
By contrast, mandatory bid rules and coattail provisions, which force the bid-
der to extend the same o¤er to all shareholders, have an ambiguous e¤ect on the
e¢ ciency of control sales (Kahan, 1993; Bebchuk, 1994). As the controlling share-
holder does not sell unless she is paid a control premium, these provisions force the
bidder to pay that premium on all shares. That is, she has to buy every outstanding
share at no less than xI + (ZI=nv). Hence, a bid succeeds only if
xB + (ZB=n) > xI + (ZI=nv). (4)
The redistribution from bidder to small shareholders makes it more expensive to
acquire control, thereby reducing takeover activity and entrenching existing control
structures. This is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it prevents all value-
decreasing bids. To see this, note that all bidders that violate (1) also violate (4)
by implication. On the other hand, the redistribution deters more value-increasing
bids. This follows from the fact that (4) is stricter than (3). This ambivalent
17 If the market for controlling blocks would be equally competitive as the market for cash ow
rights, the two-stage sale procedure would not increase the owners total proceeds.
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deterrence e¤ect is more pronounced for dual-class structures (smaller nv) because
the control premium (per share) tends to be higher.
Based on the above results, one would expect that dual-class structures in rms
with controlling shareholders reduce takeover activity but increase takeover premia
(conditional on a bid). Furthermore, privately optimal structures should increase
total market value, and voting shares should trade at a premium. Consistent with
these predictions, Zingales (1995b) and Smith and Amoaku-Adu (1995) nd that
relative price di¤erences are driven by di¤erential takeover bids for voting and non-
voting shares. Mandatory bid rules and coattail provisions make it more expensive
to acquire a rm but eradicate di¤erences in takeover gains between voting and non-
voting shareholders. Hence, they should increase total takeover premia (conditional
on a bid) but decrease voting premia and takeover activity. Consistent with this
hypothesis, voting premia have drastically fallen on the Toronto Stock Exchange
after the introduction of the coattail provision (Allaire, 2006). Overall, it seems
fair to conclude that a mandatory one share - one vote rule would improve the
control allocation in rms with controlling shareholders. As discussed earlier, this
does not hold for widely held rms.
3. Blockholder Incentives and Security-Voting Structure
Control transfer models typically take the rms assets as given and examine how
the distribution of cash ow and voting rights a¤ects the allocation of control
over these assets. A complementary strand of the literature takes the identity
of the party in control as given and explores how its decisions are inuenced by
the distribution of cash ow and voting rights. A rms ownership and control
structure inuences signicant corporate decisions such as investment or dividend
policies through two distinct channels. First, it determines the extent to which
existing shareholders actively participate in corporate decision-making as well as
the incentives and the (voting) power of those entrusted with running the rm.
Second, it a¤ects the extent to which insiders can be challenged by an outside
party, which in turn has repercussions for a broad range of corporate decisions. We
review both channels in this section.
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Many rms are characterized by the separation of ownership and control (Berle
and Means, 1933): Shareholders delegate decision-making authority to managers
to run the rm on their behalf. As a result, the manager may choose actions that
increase her private benets at the expense of the shareholderssecurity benets.
While the shareholders can limit divergences from their interest by providing ap-
propriate incentives or by monitoring the managers actions, doing so requires the
right to set rules or to correct managerial decisions whenever they disagree and
want to take action. This formal authority is embodied in the voting rights.
Yet, formal authority confers real authority, that is, e¤ective control over deci-
sions only if it is duly exercised (Aghion and Tirole, 1997). Shareholders can do
so only if they possess the relevant information. This typically does not apply to
small shareholders, who lack the incentives to collect information and oversee man-
agers. Thus, the allocation of votes among dispersed shareholders is immaterial
during the normal course of business, though, as discussed in the previous section,
it matters for the takeover outcome.
By contrast, an investor who owns a substantial fraction of cash ow rights has
the incentives to incur the monitoring costs to constrain the managers discretion,
thereby mitigating the agency problem. Indeed, concentrated ownership has been
advocated as a simple governance mechanism to promote value maximization by
rms through monitoring or through the alignment of interests. Throughout the
remainder of this section, we examine how the security-voting structure a¤ects
the e¤ectiveness of blockownership as a governance mechanism. We nd that,
outside control transfers, dual-class structures need not be dominated in rms
with controlling shareholders, because one share - one vote can both mitigate and
exacerbate agency conicts.
3.1. OUTSIDE BLOCKHOLDER AND MONITORING
From the other shareholdersperspective, the presence of an active blockholder
may or may not be benecial (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). On the one hand, the
outside blockholder can use her inuence to increase security benets, thereby
acting in the interest of all shareholders. On the other hand, she may choose
to collude with the manager to divert corporate resources and share the private
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benets.18 In this case, she becomes de facto an inside blockholder whose role we
examine subsequently. Here we assume that the blockholder is an outsider whose
interests are perfectly aligned with those of the other shareholders.
Models of shareholder monitoring (e.g., Admati et al., 1994) focus on the role of
cash ow rights and argue that monitoring incentives increase with the size of the
stake. At the same time, they typically abstract from the role of voting rights and
assume that the blockholder has the formal power to correct managerial decisions.19
This assumption is a simplication which ts the logic of the framework: Given
that shareholders have congruent interests, small shareholders can only gain from
letting the blockholder monitor and interfere on their behalf.
There are, however, various reasons why the blockholders degree of inuence
depends on both cash ow rights and votes. To push through a proposal, a block-
holder may need to be backed by su¢ ciently many votes, say a simple majority,
forcing her to mobilize support if she owns too few votes herself (Bennedsen and
Nielsen, 2006). Similarly, owning more voting rights can improve the odds of a
favorable outcome in a shareholder vote when small shareholders vote erratically
or nurture a status quo bias in favor of management (Rydqvist, 1992).
Given that votes have a distinct impact on the blockholders ability to chal-
lenge managerial decisions, leveraging voting power is advantageous if ownership of
large equity stakes entails (opportunity) costs. For instance, holding a substantial
fraction of one rms cash ow rights is costly for a risk-averse investor (Admati
et al., 1994; Bodnaruk et al., 2006). To reduce rm-specic risk, the blockholder
may even make the rm engage in value-reducing hedging activities or forgo risky
but protable investment projects (Hu, 1990). Larger stakes also reduce liquidity
in the secondary market, thereby making it more di¢ cult to sell shares when in
sudden need of cash. Finally, investors may simply not be su¢ ciently wealthy to
purchase substantial blocks in large rms.
Under the one share - one vote structure, these costs do not only constrain
18Both sides of ownership concentration are well documented in numerous empirical studies,
but the evidence is inconclusive on whether the positive or negative e¤ects dominate (Becht et al.,
2003; Berglöf and Burkart, 2003.)
19A notable exception is Shleifer and Vishny (1986b) where an incumbent blockholder after
collecting information must acquire the majority of votes either through a takeover or a proxy
contest to implement the intended changes.
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the size of the equity stake but also the voting power. To the extent that more
monitoring is desirable, it is optimal to let the blockholder own more votes than cash
ow rights. There is evidence that family owners, who often have leveraged voting
power, add value as monitors in rms managed by non-family CEOs (Villalonga
and Amit, 2006). A dual-class structure may also be desirable when too much
monitoring frustrates valuable managerial initiative (Burkart et al., 1997). In that
case, a wedge between votes and cash ow rights may simultaneously reduce the
cost of interference and the level of monitoring.
A Simple Illustration Consider a managerial rm with a single outside block-
holder L, who holds a fraction s 2 [0; 1] of the voting rights and a fraction d 2 [0; 1]
of the cash ow rights. Being risk-averse, L incurs a cost k (d) of holding a non-
diversied portfolio with kd > 0 and kdd > 0.20 The manager generates a total
value of V > 0, and can divert up to an amount Z < V (without having to fear
legal prosecution), unless L interferes.
To reverse the managerial decision L has to incur some xed cost of interference,
c. In addition, she needs to mobilize the support of other shareholders, unless she
holds a majority of the votes. More specically, the total cost of reversing a decision
is c (s) with cs < 0 for all s < 0:5 and c (s) = c for all s > 0:5. That is, interference
is cheaper when L owns more votes, and once she holds a majority of the votes she
only bears the xed cost c. Furthermore, 2c < Z, and the diverted amount is fully
recovered if L interferes.
Since the manager never loses from diversion, her (weakly) dominant strategy
is to divert the amount Z. For given values of s and d, L thus interferes when her
gain exceeds the cost of interference, i.e., dZ > c (s). Clearly, she is more likely
to reverse managerial private benet extraction when she receives a larger share d
of the gains from interference (alignment e¤ect), or when she owns more votes s,
thereby lowering her cost of interference (power e¤ect).
Leveraging Ls voting power simultaneously reduces interference and underdi-
versication costs. Thus, the optimal structure allocates to L a majority of the
20Throughout the illustrations in this section, we use the following short-hand notation. If f
is a function, fx denotes the rst-order derivative of that function with respect to x, fxx the
second-order derivative with respect to x, and fxy the cross-derivative with respect to x and y.
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votes (s > 0:5) to maximize her ability to monitor and an equity stake su¢ cient
to preserve her incentive to interfere, i.e., d = c=Z. Since 2c < Z by assumption,
d < 0:5. That is, it is cost-e¢ cient for L to own fewer cash ow rights than voting
rights.
Under one share - one vote (s = d), a reduction in the interference cost neces-
sarily goes together with higher costs of underdiversication, and vice versa. As a
result, L either diversies her wealth less or monitors the manager less.
3.2. INSIDE BLOCKHOLDER AND EXTRACTION
As small shareholders abstain from monitoring, an inside blockholder or owner-
manager in an otherwise dispersedly held rm enjoys considerable autonomy. Jensen
and Meckling (1976) show that the insider and the small shareholders have diverg-
ing interests. Assuming that the value of the rm depends on costly managerial
e¤ort, the insider underprovides such e¤ort relative to the rst-best level. She bears
all the cost but receives only part of the returns (security benets). A larger equity
stake increases her incentives to exert e¤ort, thereby aligning her interests (more)
with those of the other shareholders. Crucial for this result is the assumption of
decreasing marginal returns to e¤ort, which is to say that it becomes increasingly
di¢ cult to create more value. Unless the rm is fully owned by the insider, the
rst-best e¤ort level is not chosen. The underprovision of e¤ort constitutes (one
manifestation of) the agency cost of outside nance.
The e¤ort provision problem can be rephrased as a problem of private benet
extraction, where the insider can convert security benets into private benets but
in the process dissipates some of the value (Burkart et al., 1998). In this setting, a
larger equity stake forces the insider to internalize a greater part of the loss, thereby
inducing her to extract less private benets. The crucial assumption is that the
marginal deadweight loss increases in the level of extraction, making it increasingly
ine¢ cient to extract more private benets.21 Again, outside nance creates agency
costs, as some ine¢ cient extraction always occurs unless the insider owns the whole
rm.
21Otherwise, the inside blockholder extracts either nothing or all she can without being legally
prosecuted. The former (latter) obtains if her equity stake is larger (smaller) than the constant
marginal deadweight loss.
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The alignment e¤ect operates solely through the insiders cash ow rights. As
in the case of the outside blockholder, the vote allocation does not matter as long as
the remaining shareholders remain passive. A role for votes emerges when corporate
decisions that benet primarily the insider require shareholder approval. Bennedsen
and Nielsen (2006) suggest that the inside blockholder may need to bribe a su¢ cient
number of small shareholders to get support for her actions, thereby e¤ectively
having to share some of her private benets. As a consequence, her incentive to
divert resources may decrease in the amount of support she has to procure or,
conversely, increase in her voting power.22
A Simple Illustration Consider a rm of value V that has a single inside block-
holder I, who holds a fraction s 2 [0; 1] of the voting rights and a fraction d 2 [0; 1]
of the cash ow rights. As before, there is some action that requires majority
support, forcing I to persuade other shareholders when she is short of votes. In
addition, I can and must bribe them to vote for an action that exclusively benets
herself.
More specically, I seeks shareholder approval for an action that is neces-
sary to extract private benets. To gain shareholder approval, I needs to "buy"
max f0; 0:5  sg votes by giving up a share 1   (s) of the private benets to the
supporting small shareholders. Thus,  (s) 2 [0; 1] denotes the fraction of the pri-
vate benets that I retains, where s > 0 for s < 0:5 and  (s) = 1 for s > 0:5.
Accordingly, I keeps a larger fraction of the private benets to herself when she
owns more votes, because it requires a smaller bribe to ensure outside support.
When she owns the majority of votes, she keeps the entire private benets, as no
bribes are needed.
If I gains support, she can choose an amount z 2 [0; Z] that she wants to divert,
where Z < V . Following the previous discussion, we assume that private benet
extraction is ine¢ cient. More specically, the diverted resources are transformed
into private benets of value  (z), where z > 0, zz < 0, z (0) = 1 and z (Z) =
0.
Given I has support for the action, she chooses z to maximize  (s) (z)+d(V  
22Similar arguments have been put forward in the context of multiple blockholders (Bennedsen
and Wolfenzon, 2000; Nagar et al., 2004).
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z). Because  (z) is concave in z, the solution is given by the rst-order condition
z (z) = d= (s) . (5)
Due to the ine¢ cient extraction technology, Is preferred extraction level decreases
in her share of cash ow rights (alignment e¤ect), while it increases in her share of
voting rights as long as s < 0:5 (power e¤ect). The latter e¤ect stems from the fact
that she must buy fewer votes, thereby retaining a larger share  (s) of the private
benets.
Thus, dual-class shares, notably controlling minority shareholder structures,
exacerbate agency conicts among shareholders: They simultaneously increase the
incentives and the ability of the inside blockholder to extract private benets. By
contrast, one share - one vote either strengthens the alignment e¤ect if I holds a
large(r) equity stake or weakens her ability to extract private benets if she owns
a small(er) block. In either case, the level of extraction decreases.
This and the previous section together imply that leveraging a blockholders
voting power entails a trade-o¤: It makes her a more e¤ective monitor of man-
agement, but it also enables her to extract more private benets (Bennedsen and
Nielsen, 2006). In the above examples, an increase in s reduces the cost c (s) of
overruling the management but also increases the share  (s) of private benets
accruing to the blockholder. Hence, the e¤ect of disproportionate voting power is
indeterminate.
Insiders, whether managers or inside blockholders, are constrained in their be-
havior not only by existing shareholders but also by the ease with which outsiders
can gain control. The mere possibility of a takeover has, for example, a disciplinary
e¤ect if the fear of being ousted induces insiders to abstain from self-serving actions
(Grossman and Hart, 1980b; Scharfstein, 1988).
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3.3. ALIGNMENT AND CONTROL CONTESTABILITY
Control contestability and partial ownership concentration are alternative mech-
anisms to mitigate the conict between insiders and (outside) shareholders.23 It
thus seems ideal to discipline insiders by using both mechanisms. But to the extent
that votes are tied to cash ow rights, the two are inversely related: More shares
endow the insider with more cash ow rights (more alignment) but also with more
votes (less contestability). For instance, under the one share - one vote structure,
every increase in cash ow rights is matched by a proportional increase in voting
rights.24
Separating votes from cash ow rights changes the interplay between the two
mechanisms. If the insider holds more votes than cash ow rights, she is well-
protected from a takeover while being poorly aligned with the other shareholders
(Bebchuk et al., 2000; Masulis et al., 2007). This simultaneously undermines both
mechanisms, thereby increasing the insiders incentives to engage in self-dealings.25
As the subsequent example illustrates, the security-voting structure can in principle
also be used to achieve the opposite, that is, to strengthen the two mechanisms.
A Simple Illustration Consider the previous example with a rm of value V
and a single inside blockholder I, who holds a fraction s 2 [0; 1] of the voting
rights and a fraction d 2 [0; 1] of the cash ow rights. As before, I can divert an
amount z 2 [0; Z] of corporate resources and transform them into private benets
of value  (z), where z > 0, zz < 0, z (0) = 1 and z (Z) = 0. We replace
the previously required shareholder approval with the possibility of a takeover, in
23The use of incentive pay is another means to alleviate the conict of interests. Indeed, stock-
based performance schemes and ownership stakes provide very similar incentives (e.g., Gordon,
1940; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). However, insiders may have considerable inuence over the
design of their compensation and use it as a means to extract private benets rather than to align
interests. This argument has been made both in the context of inside blockholders (Cheung et al.,
2005) and professional managers (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004). Overall, the empirical evidence
nonetheless suggests that ownership concentration coincides with more e¤ective compensation
schemes (e.g., Core et al., 1999; Dyl, 1988; Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Hartzell and Starks, 2003;
Santerre and Neun, 1986; Sautner and Weber, 2006; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989).
24The two conicting e¤ects can imply a non-monotonic relationship between inside ownership
and share value (e.g., Morck et al., 1988). For instance, the alignment e¤ect may initially dominate,
but above some level the entrenchment e¤ect may prevail (e.g., Stulz, 1988). The shape of the
relationship is an empirical question about which there is yet no consensus in the literature (Adams
and Ferreira, 2007).
25As discussed in section 2.1.1., one share - one vote need not necessarily maximize control
contestability in widely held rms.
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which case I sells her block at an exogenously given price P , and foregoes her entire
private benets. The probability of a takeover depends on Is voting power s, and
is denoted by 1    (s) with  (s) 2 [0; 1], s > 0 for s < 0:5, and  (s) = 1 for
s > 0:5. That is, a takeover is less likely if I owns more votes, and infeasible when
I owns a majority of the votes.
For given s and d, Is optimal extraction decision maximizes  (s) [ (z) + d (V   z)]+
[1   (s)]P . The rst term reects her payo¤ from remaining in control, whereas
the second term represents her proceeds in case of a takeover. As  (z) is concave
in z, the solution is given by the rst-order condition
z (z) = d= (s) . (6)
This condition coincides with condition (5), except that  (s) replaces  (s). As
before, extraction decreases in Is share of cash ow rights (alignment e¤ect), while
it increases in her voting power, as long as s < 0:5 (entrenchment e¤ect). When I
owns more votes, the takeover becomes less likely, thereby increasing the probability
 (s) that she actually benets from the extraction.
As the level of extraction increases in the di¤erence (s  d), one share - one vote
indeed protects minority shareholders. A zero wedge entails less private benet
extraction which in turn translates into higher security benets. However, this
is not the e¢ cient solution. Even better is to let the di¤erence (s  d) assume a
negative value. That is, extraction is lowest under an insider or manager who owns
a large block of only non-voting shares, thereby being strongly aligned and easily
contestable.
In practice, insiders who hold a substantial nancial interest but no (or less)
votes seem rare, if not inexistent. Instead, rms are either owned and run by large
owners who are largely insulated from hostile takeovers, or are widely held and run
by contestable managers who are much less aligned. These patterns arise because
abstaining from diversication and holding an illiquid block is costly. Hence, a
wealthy investor is willing to hold a block only if she gets additional benets,
whether from monitoring or extraction. In either case, she requires inuence and
hence votes. In the absence of such benets, she prefers to diversify her wealth.
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Given these alternatives, the relevant question seems to be whether blockowner-
ship or control contestability is the more e¤ective governance mechanism. Neither
mechanism is without aws. On the one hand, blockownership leads to conicts
among shareholders, as already pointed out. Control contestability, on the other
hand, may aggravate rather than mitigate managerial agency problems.
3.4. BENEFITS OF ENTRENCHMENT
The preceding section emphasizes the disciplinary e¤ect of the takeover threat.
However, control contestability comes with costs as well as benets, and its overall
impact is much debated in the literature. Actual takeovers can be a manifestation
as much as a cure of agency problems. For instance, acquisitions may be driven
by managerial overcondence (Roll, 1986; Malmendier and Tate, 2004) or empire-
building motives (Jensen, 1986). If so, takeovers may destroy or redistribute rather
than create value.
Furthermore, the mere threat of a takeover may distort insidersbehavior rather
than induce them to pursue prot-maximizing actions. First, if takeovers are un-
dertaken for reasons other than reversing ine¢ cient or self-serving behavior, acting
in the shareholders best interest need not be an e¤ective protection against a
takeover.26 Second, insiders who are exposed to a substantial takeover threat may
waste e¤ort on measures to protect themselves. Apart from poison pills, stock re-
purchases or litigation to fend o¤ hostile takeovers, they may pursue more opaque
strategies, like undertaking skill-specic investments to become less easily replace-
able (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) or awarding workers generous long-term contracts,
thereby making the target less attractive (Pagano and Volpin, 2005).
Third, the takeover threat may discourage investments in rm-specic human
capital that may become redundant after a control change (Knoeber, 1986; Ippolito,
2006). More generally, if takeovers imply some form of contract renegotiation
("breach of trust"), the rms stakeholders are reluctant to tie their fate to the
rm and prefer to develop generic skills that increase their value in the external
labor market (Shleifer and Summers, 1988).
26 Indeed, the empirical evidence lends only limited support to the notion that takeovers are
directed at poorly performing rms (Burkart and Panunzi, 2006).
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Finally, the takeover pressure may lead to managerial myopia. That is, insiders
may pursue investment strategies that favor short-term earnings over long-term
protability to avoid being undervalued and taken over (Stein, 1988; Chemmanur
and Jiao, 2006). For instance, the takeover threat may hinder rms from pursuing
long-term strategies, such as investments in R&D.27
The common theme of the above arguments is that some protection from
takeovers may preserve or promote insidersincentives to increase rm value. Hence,
deviations that entrench insiders are not necessarily ine¢ cient or detrimental to mi-
nority shareholders, as the following example illustrates.
A Simple Illustration Consider a rm that is managed by an insider I who,
for simplicity, owns no cash ow rights and only enjoys private benets. Total rm
value V (e) is now an increasing function of Is e¤ort e, and the marginal returns to
e¤ort are decreasing (Ve > 0 and Vee < 0). If I remains in control, she can extract
a fraction  of the total rm value as private benets. In contrast to before, private
benet extraction does not dissipate any value. Thus, I generates security benets
XI = (1  )V (e) and private benets of ZI = V (e).28
If the rm is taken over, I is ousted and loses all her private benets. The
takeover probability  (s; V ) decreases (weakly) in Is voting power s and total
rm value V (e) (s 6 0 and V 6 0).
Given the above assumptions, I chooses e¤ort e to maximize her expected payo¤
 = (1  )ZI   e = (1  )V (e)  e,
and the rst-order condition is given by
(1  )Ve   V V Ve = 1.
The left-hand side comprises the marginal returns to e¤ort. The rst term captures
27The evidence on short-termism due to the takeover threat is scarce and divided. Meulbroek et
al. (1990) nd a decrease in R&D expenditures following the adoption of takeover defences, while
Pugh et al. (1992) present contrary results.
28This simplies the argument but ignores that I may extract more when she owns less cash
ow rights. Since the example already abstracts from the alignment e¤ect, setting Is equity stake
equal to zero (d = 0) imposes no meaningful further restriction. While the absence of an alignment
e¤ect biases the result in favor of deviations from one share - one vote, it highlights the trade-o¤
between the disciplinary and the initiative e¤ect of the takeover threat.
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the idea that I exerts more e¤ort when she is more likely to retain control, i.e.,
when (1  ) is large. We refer to this as the initiative e¤ect. The second term
measures how e¤ective e¤ort is as a takeover deterrent or, more precisely, how much
this e¤ect is worth to I. We refer to this as the disciplinary e¤ect.
For the further analysis, it proves convenient to rewrite the rst-order condition
as
1  ( + V V ) = 1=Ve. (7)
As the right-hand side increases in e¤ort due to Vee < 0, the e¤ort level that satises
this equation must increase when the left-hand side is larger.
As a benchmark, consider rst the case in which I holds a majority of the votes
(s > 0:5) and is therefore immune to the takeover threat. In this case, the takeover
probability is zero ( = V = 0), and the rst-order condition simplies to Ve = 1.
Whether a di¤erent vote allocation that allows for a takeover (s < 0:5) induces
more e¤ort depends on the sign of ( + V V ). If  > jV V j, a controlling insider
exerts more e¤ort than an insider who is exposed to the takeover threat. That
is, the initiative e¤ect dominates the disciplinary e¤ect, and minimizing control
contestability provides the strongest incentives to create value. By contrast, if
 < jV V j the takeover threat disciplines the insider, i.e., induces her to work
harder.
To analyze the question further, we assume contestability (s < 0:5) and take
the partial derivative of the left-hand side of (7) with respect to s. This yields
@
@s
(1     V V ) =   (s + V sV ) .
When this expression is positive, i.e., (s + V sV ) is negative, the left-hand side of
(7) increases in s. This in turn implies that more voting power induces the insider
to exert more e¤ort.
Simple inspection reveals the two aforementioned e¤ects. The rst term s is
always negative and captures that the insiders initiative increases in s as it becomes
more likely that she retains control. The second term V sV is also negative if
V s < 0. The latter condition implies that the extent to which a further increase
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in rm value reduces the takeover probability increases in s. If this holds, more
voting power also provides stronger incentives to fend o¤ a takeover by increasing
rm value. As a result, less insider votes unambiguously reduce e¤ort. By contrast,
if V s > 0, frustrating takeovers by increasing the rm value becomes more e¤ective
when the insider has less voting power. In this case, a genuine trade-o¤ between
initiative and discipline emerges.
Active large shareholders are an important governance mechanism to mitigate
managerial agency problems. The preceding analysis shows that dual-class struc-
tures empower blockholders, thereby reinforcing both costs and benets of this
governance mechanism. On the one hand, leveraging voting power makes the block-
holder a more e¤ective monitor. On the other hand, she may use that power to
take self-serving actions at the expense of the minority shareholders. Similarly,
leveraged voting power o¤ers protection from the takeover threat, which can align
but also distort blockholder incentives.
These e¤ects are weakened under one share - one vote, as is the position of the
blockholder. While this mitigates the conict among shareholders, it also strength-
ens the position of managers, thereby aggravating the shareholder-manager conict.
Whether entrenched owners or contestable managers are more prone to maximize
rm value is debatable (Bolton and von Thadden, 1998). Managers are more ex-
posed to hostile takeovers, but typically have a much smaller stake in the rm.29
This trade-o¤ is central not only for the one share - one vote debate but for corpo-
rate governance in general (Becht et al., 2003).
The ambiguity is reected in empirical studies which examine the relationship
between deviations from one share - one vote and rm value. Although some
studies nd a negative relationship (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002; Cronqvist and
Nilsson, 2003), the overall evidence is inconclusive. In addition, endogeneity issues
preclude clear statements about causality, and there exists virtually no evidence
that deviations reduce total rm value, that is, the sum of security benets and
private benets (Adams and Ferreira, 2007).
29 In spite of stock option plans and the like, compensation packages for top executives typically
dwarf in comparison to the equity stakes of most large owners. In fact, controlling shareholders
often own non-voting shares in addition to their control stake (Bergström and Rydqvist, 1990),
which is di¢ cult to reconcile with the view that dual-class shares are purely a vehicle to extract
maximum private benets at the expense of minority shareholders.
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The imminent policy conclusion is that mandating one share - one vote entails
costs and benets: It protects small shareholders against private benet extraction
by large shareholders, but leaves managers with more discretion and hence the
ability to extract more private benets. Such a policy must therefore be based on
the belief that other governance mechanisms discipline managers su¢ ciently well.
However, concentrated ownership structures tend to be prevalent in countries in
which other governance mechanisms are weaker.30 This suggests that improvements
in the general corporate governance environment should precede any intervention
directly aimed at discouraging blockownership (Berglöf and Burkart, 2003).
4. Regulating Security-Voting Structure
Restrictions on the security-voting structure reduce the types of securities that
entrepreneurs can o¤er to investors. For instance, one share - one vote precludes a
disproportional distribution of cash ow and voting rights, as used in a controlling
minority structure. Such restrictions may ultimately a¤ect entrepreneurial choices,
e.g., whether and how to raise capital or to maintain control. In fact, the arguments
reviewed in this section suggest that mandating one share - one vote can have a
distortionary e¤ect on rmsnancing and investment decisions, or induces rms
to resort to other means of separating ownership and control.
The common approach to analyze such situations is to adopt the perspective
of a founder who chooses the initial ownership and control structure anticipating
its e¤ects on future corporate decisions. Investors, having equal foresight, pay a
fair price for the shares that they buy. The subsequent discussion is based on this
framework.
4.1. CHOICE OF OWNERSHIP
Tying votes to cash ow rights increases the amount of equity capital required
for owning a given share of voting rights. As a result, a corporate insider must retain
more cash ow rights to control a rm, or conversely, must relinquish more voting
power when selling cash ow rights to outsiders. Paradoxically, this means that
30This does not apply to countries where shareholder rights are relatively restricted such that
votes confer little control over board and top management. In this case, owning a large block
yields costs but little economic benets.
34
one share - one vote can both discourage and promote ownership concentration.
Either case can have undesirable consequences.
In the rst case, large owners give up control because the (opportunity) costs
of concentrating their wealth in a single rm are too high. Relative to a dual-
class structure, one share - one vote increases the cost of holding a controlling
position. Consequently, a controlling minority blockholder may respond to the
introduction of a one share - one vote rule by reducing her voting power rather than
by acquiring more cash ow rights. Relinquishing power may be self-reinforcing
when it reduces the blockholders (expected) private benets and hence makes it
less worthwhile to hold the block altogether.31 As already discussed, the resulting
ownership deconcentration, while mitigating the conict among shareholders, is
bound to leave more discretion to the manager.
In the second case, owners are reluctant to oat shares for fear of attracting
bidders and (potentially) losing control (Bebchuk, 1999). Entrepreneurs who value
control (benets) may tap into the equity market only if they are granted some
safeguard against takeovers or if they can choose an ownership structure which
guarantees little interference by outside investors (Pagano and Röell, 1998). Ac-
cordingly, they will be reluctant to go public when public capital markets stipulate
strict corporate governance rules that impede their autonomy (Boot et al., 2006).
Instead, they may prefer to enter private contracts which do not impose listing and
disclosure costs or migrate to markets with more lax regulations.32 Worse still,
publicly listed rms may simply forgo valuable investments that would require an
equity recapitalization (Attari and Banerjee, 2004; Banerjee, 2005; Kihlstrom and
Wachter, 2005). Indeed, evidence in Bauguess et al. (2007) suggests that control-
oriented but risk-averse entrepreneurs rely on issuing non-voting shares to nance
new high-risk projects that they would otherwise not undertake. Similarly, Chem-
manur and Jiao (2006) argue that such dual-class recapitalizations, which allow
31 In a study of voluntary (as opposed to mandatory) share class unications, Pajuste (2005)
nds that the controlling minority shareholder afterwards owned less than 10 percent of the stock
in 20 out of 71 cases.
32 It is sometimes claimed that successful dual-class rms, like Warren Bu¤ets Berkshire-
Hathaway Inc. or Google Inc., may have remained private, if the founders had been unable to
retain control. Whether stricter regulations push undesirable rms out of the market or lead
sound rms to resort to inferior means of nancing is an open question that is also raised in the
context of other corporate governance rules, e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Zingales, 2006).
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entrepreneurs to raise capital without increasing the takeover threat, serve to -
nance long-term investment strategies. In accordance with these arguments, several
studies nd positive value e¤ects for dual-class recapitalizations (e.g., Partch, 1987;
Dimitrov and Jain, 2006). Smart and Zutter (2002) show that dual-class rms are
more likely to return to the market for more capital in the years following their
IPO, and the evidence in Smart and Zutter (2003) supports the view that dual-class
structures are chosen by entrepreneurs who value post-IPO control.
The last point suggests that a mandatory one share - one vote rule would deter
rms from tapping public markets or going public. This seems at odds with the
empirical regularity that better minority shareholder protection is associated with
larger public markets (La Porta et al., 2000). Yet, this need not be a contradiction
since dual-class structures, like large owners, may be a consequence rather than
a determinant of poor governance institutions. In contrast, the above argument
is a ceteris paribus statement: For an otherwise given institutional environment,
imposing one share - one vote reduces entrepreneurs incentives to raise outside
equity, as they value control. Consistent with this view, many US rms adopt
anti-takeover provisions, including dual-class shares, when going public (Field and
Karpo¤, 2002).
Last but not least, it should be noted that allowing entrepreneurs to choose the
ownership and control structure that maximizes their total benets, including their
expected proceeds from share sales, rewards and hence encourages entrepreneurial
activity.
4.2. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Irrespective of its optimality, a mandatory one share - one vote rule may not
achieve its desired objective as rms may opt for other ways to separate ownership
and control (Bebchuk and Hart, 2002). First, a wedge between cash ow rights
and voting rights can also be created by linking multiple rms, each with a single
share class, through pyramids or cross-ownership structures. A pyramid consists
of a hierarchy of rms in which higher-tier rms own shares in lower-tier rms.
This device allows to attain a controlling minority structure and is often chosen
for this purpose. For instance, a three-tier pyramid enables a party to fully control
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the bottom-tier rm while holding merely 12,5 percent of its cash ow rights. It
only requires a majority stake in the top-tier rm which owns a majority stake
in the middle-tier rm which in turn owns a majority stake in the bottom-tier.
The leverage is achieved by transforming the remaining shares in each tier into
de facto non-voting shares. By chaining more rms, the wedge between cash ow
rights and voting rights can be substantially increased without losing control over
the rms in the pyramid.33 In cross-ownership structures rms own shares in each
other. Thus, the voting rights used to control a group of rms are distributed
over the entire group rather than concentrated in the hands of a single party.
Since pyramids and cross-ownership can replicate controlling minority structures
achievable through dual-class shares, the insights about the impact of deviations
in rms with controlling shareholders are also applicable to them (Bebchuk et
al., 2000). However, there may be di¤erences along other dimensions, such as
market liquidity (Becht, 1999), which have not yet been explored theoretically.34
In addition, pyramids and cross-ownership fulll other functions. They allow rms
to create an internal labor and capital market or facilitate vertical and horizontal
integration (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). We do not
cover these aspects of business groups here.
Second, recent capital market developments have made it easier and cheaper
for shareholders to trade their cash ow rights or voting rights with other in-
vestors, thereby unbundling the rms security-voting structure (Hu and Black,
2006a, 2006b). For instance, stock options allow a shareholder to hedge her direct
nancial interest in a rm while retaining her voting rights. At the same time,
her counterparty assumes a nancial interest in the rm without any correspond-
ing (formal) inuence. Conversely, the security-lending market allows investors to
borrow votes without assuming any rm-related economic risk. When an investor
borrows a share from its legal owner, the dividends ultimately still accrue to the
lending shareholder but the vote may be exercised by the borrower. If votes and
33 In East Asia, where multiple share classes are commonly prohibited, many business groups
rely on pyramids and cross-ownership to concentrate control (Claessens et al., 2000). In Europe
pyramids are used by 19 percent of listed European rms that have a controlling shareholder at
the 20 percent level (Faccio and Lang, 2002).
34Villalonga and Amit (2007) report that family rms with dual-class structures have lower
market values than those with pyramids.
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cash ow rights can be fully unbundled through market transactions, the security-
voting structure loses its relevance (Hart, 1995). Any shareholder can privately
engineer her desired combination of cash ow and voting rights, including extreme
deviations from one share - one vote. A particular disconcerting issue is that an
investor could in principle own voting rights of a rm in which she has a negative
economic interest (Martin and Partnoy, 2005). While it is yet unclear to what
extent vote trading a¤ects corporate decision-making, there exist some evidence of
increased vote trading around major corporate events (Christo¤ersen et al., 2005).
Given that these transactions are beyond the rms control, a thorough analysis
requires an explicit model of the market(s) in which they take place.35
In light of the above, a comprehensive one share - one vote rule seems to require
that multi-rm structures and capital market transactions are regulated as well.
Otherwise, shareholders may resort to these alternative, possibly less stable and
more opaque, means in which case the policy might backre. However, discourag-
ing these forms of deviations, while in principle possible, impairs their other impor-
tant functions, such as internal capital markets or improved risk-sharing through
derivative transactions.
Another implementation issue is how holders of superior voting rights should
be compensated in stock unications, which are essentially a sale of voting power
from superior vote to inferior vote shareholders. While voluntary unications imply
mutually benecial terms of trade (see next subsection), mandated unications
must specify (a procedure to determine) the terms of this transaction, as the parties
are bound to disagree. The regulators problem is that the parties are neither
inclined to reveal their information nor to bargain voluntarily due to the inherent
redistribution.36 Any specic procedure is likely to be biased in favour of one
or the other party (Bergström and Rydqvist, 1990; Bigelli et al., 2007; Hauser
and Lauterbach, 2004). Neither can this redistributional conict be removed by
selling the entire rm in a bidding contest among single-class (shell) companies.
35This is beyond the scope of this survey, and we refer the reader to a small but growing literature
on this subject (Blair et al., 1989; Hu and Black, 2006a, 2006b; Neeman and Orosel, 2006).
36The case of the Siemens AG in Germany illustrates some of these di¢ culties (McCahery et
al., 2004): The shareholders decided to abolish a special share class without compensation, and
in response the Siemens family sued the rm for compensation. The claim was rst acknowledged
by a Munich court, which awarded the family a compensation of about EUR 32 million based on
past price di¤erences, but the decision was later reversed by the Higher Court of Bavaria.
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A majority shareholder would always ensure that the bidder o¤ering her the most
generous compensation wins the contest. To avoid this outcome, her voting power
would have to be diluted prior to the contest, which brings back the initial question
of how to compensate superior vote shareholders in unications.
4.3. MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION
In the policy debate, one share - one vote is advocated as a means to protect
small shareholders against private benet extraction by controlling minority share-
holders. While the existence of private benets is widely documented (e.g., Doidge,
2004; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Nenova, 2003; Zingales, 1995b), this does not im-
ply that resources are allocated less e¢ ciently. E¢ ciency is measured by total rm
value, i.e. the sum of security benets and private benets. The evidence as to
whether or not private benet extraction by controlling shareholders reduces total
rm value is inconclusive (Adams and Ferreira, 2007).
Apart from e¢ ciency considerations, policy-makers may consider minority share-
holder protection an important policy objective. However, sophisticated investors,
who are aware of corporate governance problems, ought to anticipate private bene-
t extraction. If so, they will demand an appropriate discount and earn a fair rate
of return. Thus, there is no need for regulation unless one believes that markets are
not e¢ cient, that is, investors systematically underestimate the value consequences
of private benet extraction.37 Although they may sometimes do so (Ehrhardt and
Nowak, 2003), the existing evidence strongly suggests that the extent of private
benet extraction is anticipated. That is, stock returns of dual-class rms are not
lower than those of single-class rms (e.g., Gompers et al., 2007; Smart et al.,
2007). Similar results are found when rms are sorted according to other corporate
governance measures (Core et al., 2006; Cremers and Nair, 2005), suggesting that
"corporate governance" risk is correctly priced.
In addition, it is sometimes argued that rms in which controlling shareholders
are likely to extract private benets have a higher cost of equity or are even unable
37The growing behavioral nance literature allows for persistently mistaken agents (e.g., Shleifer
and Vishny, 2003; Stein, 1996). While this in principle creates scope for regulators to protect
investors from their own poor decisions, Daniel et al. (2002) argue that the government should not
respond through direct interventions, which are equally prone to bounded rationality, but through
measures that improve private decision-making (e.g., disclosure and reporting).
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to raise su¢ cient funds. For instance, Giannetti and Simonov (2006) document that
investors shy away from rms that they associate with poor corporate governance,
including dual-class rms. Hence, rms that deviate from one share - one vote may
have to forego protable investments and experience lower growth. This argument
neglects, however, the fact that the security-voting structure is contractible and
alterable. If there is a surplus to be shared from further investment, the controlling
shareholder should be able to propose an alternative security-voting structure, e.g. a
share class unication, with an appropriate compensation scheme such that indeed
everyone fares better than under the current structure. Similarly, an entrepreneur
who goes public is free to choose a security-voting structure that alleviates nancial
constraints. Consistent with the notion of e¢ cient (re)negotiation, some studies
report positive announcement e¤ects for dual-class recapitalizations (as already
mentioned), some for voluntary share class unications (Pajuste, 2005), and some
for both (Ang and Magginson, 1989). This suggests that the endogenous choices
observed in practice may be optimal responses to a rms given situation.
However, regulation may be justied when agency problems lead shareholders
to approve structures that are against their best interest, for example, because of
managerial inuence over the decision process, or because of coordination prob-
lems (Gordon, 1988; Neeman, 1999).38 Dominant shareholders, in particular, may
take advantage of the possibility to weaken the inuence of minority shareholders
(Gilson, 1987). As a result, an entrepreneur who goes public may be unable to guar-
antee initial shareholders that their voting rights will not be diluted in the future.
This commitment problem may in turn lead to nancial constraints that cannot be
contracted away (Becht et al., 2003). One possible policy response is to disallow,
or mandate a shareholder vote over, any midstream change in the security-voting
structure that would weaken the voting rights of the existing shareholders. This
would still enable dominant shareholders to raise additional funds without having
to surrender control, while preventing any consolidation of control at the expense
of existing shareholders. In the US, similar regulations are currently in place at
38For instance, a (voluntary) dual-class exchange o¤er can expose dispersed shareholders to a
pressure-to-tender problem (Ruback 1988; Arruñada and Paz-Ares, 1995). See section 2.2.1. for a
brief description of the pressure-to-tender problem. Concerns of this kind sparked a policy debate
during the US takeover wave of the 1980s when many rms used dual-class recapitalizations to
centralize control in the hands of insiders (Fischel, 1987; Seligman, 1986).
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the NYSE, the Amex and NASDAQ (Ferrarini, 2006).
5. Lock-In Mechanisms
So far, the analysis has focused on cash ow and vote allocations that can be
implemented or replicated with a dual-class share structure. Other mechanisms
to allocate voting power disproportionately among shareholders are voting and
ownership ceilings, priority shares, depositary certicates and double voting shares.
These devices that we discuss in turn primarily serve to lock-in control.
Ownership and Voting Restrictions Voting ceilings limit the number of votes
that a shareholder can cast irrespective of the number of voting shares she owns.
That is, all shares held in excess of the ceiling lose their votes, which can drive a
wedge between the cash ow rights and the voting rights of a blockholder. Own-
ership ceilings prohibit shareholders to own more shares than a certain threshold.
Although ownership ceilings are strictly speaking not deviations from the propor-
tionality principle, they prevent individual shareholders from accumulating a sub-
stantial stake and voting power, thereby limiting the ability to inuence corporate
decisions.
In contrast to di¤erential voting shares, voting and ownership ceilings are pri-
marily introduced to dilute rather than leverage shareholdersability to concentrate
control. That is, they hinder the emergence and inuence of large shareholders,
thereby making takeovers virtually impossible. At the same time, they fragment
power and impede e¤ective monitoring of the management. Voting ceilings have
been justied on grounds that they protect minority shareholders from parties who
seek to gain control with the purpose of looting the rm (Franks and Mayer, 1998a).
However, they leave shareholders at the mercy of managers who are largely insu-
lated from blockholder interference and takeovers (Goergen et al., 2005). That is,
they simultaneously undermine the two major mechanisms for disciplining man-
agers: outside monitoring and control contestability.
As voting ceilings can be removed by shareholder vote, they are not an absolute
safeguard against takeovers.39 Moreover, voting on a removal is similar to (directly)
39While voting restrictions partly explain the low level of hostile takeovers in Germany, the
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voting on an acquisition o¤er, a mechanism proposed by Bebchuk and Hart (2001)
to overcome coordination problems in tender o¤ers. Like the Bebchuk-Hart mecha-
nism, it resolves the pressure-to-tender problem. If a majority of shareholders were
to eliminate the ceiling, disapproving shareholders would still have the option to
tender. Thus, the latter have no incentives to distort their preferences in the vote
due to hedging considerations. When voting on the removal, shareholders compare
pre-takeover share value with the returns from tendering or retaining their shares,
and therefore do not remove the ceiling when confronted with a value-decreasing
bid. Removable ceilings do, however, not overcome the free-rider problem in case
of a value-increasing bid. Once a ceiling is removed by vote, each shareholder still
prefers to retain her share unless the bidder o¤ers at least the post-takeover share
value.
A special case of restrictions are foreign ownership ceilings. It is often claimed
that they serve to ensure that national champions remain in domestic hands. While
this may be true in many or even most cases, Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995) provide
an alternative rationale. In their theoretical model, a foreign ownership ceiling
helps the rm to extract a higher share premium from foreign investors. They
predict that this e¤ect exists in countries that benet from (international) capital
ight and nd empirical support for this hypothesis in the case of Switzerland.40
Nevertheless, foreign ownership ceilings protect rms from foreign acquirers.
Priority Shares Priority shares grant their holders extraordinary decision pow-
ers in specic matters. For example, they may entitle them to appoint board
members or veto a proposed merger. Priority shares and its associated privileges
are often tied to the identity of the person or institution that they are issued to,
as e.g. governmental authorities (in which case they are commonly called golden
shares). Their holders put (too) much emphasis on their private benets when
taking decisions, and may block control changes or other decisions that endanger
hostile bid for Continental by Pirelli was substantially delayed but not prevented by the voting
ceilings (Franks and Mayer, 1998b). On these accounts, the initial proposal for the European
Takeover Directive saw voting ceilings as a primary target of the break-through rule (McCahery
et al., 2004).
40Supportive evidence is found in studies reporting that rms non-voting shares sometimes
trade at a premium over their voting shares when foreign ownership of the latter is restricted (e.g.,
Odegaard, 2006).
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these benets, against the interest of the other shareholders. In the case of golden
shares, such "private" benets may preserve public (national) interests or simply
serve self-interested politicians.41 In other cases, they accrue to corporate insiders.
For instance, priority shares in the Netherlands have typically been sold to foun-
dations that are controlled by management-friendly parties or even the company
directors themselves (Kabir et al., 1997; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2006). This en-
dows the board with substantial powers, notably to appoint its own members. As a
result, an unwanted large shareholder cannot easily obtain control of the rms key
positions, and insiders are insulated from outside monitoring and hostile takeovers.
Depositary Certicates Another e¤ective entrenchment device are depositary
certicates, which are common in the Netherlands. These certicates carry the
shares cash ow rights but no direct voting rights. The actual shares of the
company are administered by a foundation which in turn issues the depositary
certicates. In order to vote, certicate holders must request a voting proxy from
the foundation. Otherwise, the foundation will exercise the voting rights.42 This
typically leaves the majority of the votes in the hands of a foundation whose board
members have links with the management of the rm (Renneboog and Szilagyi,
2006).
Double Voting Shares In a system of double voting shares, shareholders re-
ceive an additional vote for every share that they have held in their own name for
a minimum number of years.43 In France, this privilege can be restricted to share-
holders from the European Union, Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland (Knudsen,
2005). Since the double vote is not attached to the share but is granted to the
41Government controlled rms may follow political rather than economic objectives (Shleifer,
1998, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Grundmann and Möslein, 2003). Yet, Bortolotti and Faccio
(2006) nd that golden shares need not harm the other shareholders as the government may be
more likely to bail out the rm during distress (despite the fact that this may deteriorate ex-ante
incentives). For wider discussions of the interplay between politics and corporate control, see
Jensen (1991) and Hellwig (2000).
42Another specic feature of the Dutch governance system is the structured regime, which is
mandatory for rms with more than 100 employees or subscribed capital in excess of e11.4M. It
transfers numerous powers from the shareholders to the supervisory board, such as the approval
of annual accounts or the election of management and supervisory directors (Moerland, 2002).
Formally, this does not violate the proportionality principle but reduces shareholder rights in toto.
43The legal provisions for double voting shares in France date back to 1933 and were designed to
compensate for the prohibition of dual-class shares (Conac, 2005). The minimum holding period
before the additional vote is granted is typically two years but can be longer.
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holder, it cannot be transferred. That is, double voting shares do not constitute a
separate share class and revert to ordinary shares when changing hands.
The system of double voting shares resembles a dual-class share structure con-
sisting of ordinary voting shares and shares with two votes each. Like dual-class
shares, they can serve to consolidate an incumbents control and to favor her in
control contests (Lannoo, 1999). But in contrast to dual-class shares, they may
impair takeovers even when the incumbent is willing to relinquish control. Since
the double votes are lost in a transaction, the block may no longer command a
majority of the votes in the hands of the bidder. Thus, the incumbent cannot
ensure the success of the takeover. Moreover, when a mandatory bid rule is in
place, as in France, the bidder must extend an o¤er to all outstanding shares.
She cannot price-discriminate between double voting and ordinary shares because
they legally constitute a single class. This is equivalent to having a coattail pro-
vision in a dual-class rm, as it forces the bidder to o¤er a control premium also
to small shareholders (section 2.B). Thus, the mandatory bid rule reinforces the
entrenchment e¤ect of double voting shares.
Double voting shares are defended as protecting rms against the inuence of
institutional investors with short holding periods (high turnover), who may pres-
sure managers to pursue short-term prots at the expense of long-term protability.
Such allegations have recently been raised against activist hedge funds (Becht et
al., 2006; Kahan and Rock, 2006). However, empirical studies indicate that institu-
tional ownership leads to less, rather than more, short-term investments.44 In fact,
Edmans (2007) argues that institutional investors encourage long-term investments
by collecting information about rmsfuture protability and (partially) revealing
this information to the market through their trades.
Lock-in mechanisms are functionally similar to anti-takeover charter amend-
ments.45 Whether these are benecial or detrimental for shareholders is debated.
44For instance, Bushee (1998) nds that by and large institutional shareholdings are associated
with more long-term investment. Similar results are found in other papers, many of which are
referenced in Kahan and Rock (2006).
45By the end of the 1980s, most S&P 500 rms and a vast majority of those rms listed on the
NYSE or the American Stock Exchange are covered by several anti-takeover devices, including
supermajority rules, fair-price amendments, staggered boards or the authorization of preference
shares, which are all subject to shareholder approval (Danielson and Karpo¤, 1998; Comment and
Schwert, 1995).
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The arguments largely replicate those put forward in the controversy about the ben-
ets and costs of contestable control (as described in sections 3.C and 3.D). That is,
the entrenchment view argues that defensive measures allow incumbent managers
to protect their private benets at the expense of the shareholders, thereby hin-
dering an e¢ cient redeployment of corporate assets. By contrast, the shareholder
interest view holds that they protect managers (and rms) from the disruptive ef-
fects of takeovers, enabling them to e.g., focus on long-term projects. In addition,
defensive measures a¤ect the dynamics of the tender o¤er process to the benet of
shareholders who lack coordination, by reinforcing the bargaining role of manage-
ment on their behalf (Harris, 1990). This may prevent coercive bids (Bebchuk and
Hart, 2001) and promote competition among bidders once the company has come
into play (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986a). The empirical evidence on the e¤ects of
anti-takeover devices is inconclusive and does not resolve the debate (Adams and
Ferreira, 2007; Becht et al., 2003; Burkart and Panunzi, 2006).
Apart from double voting shares, the above mechanisms grant insiders consid-
erable protection from takeovers, even if they own very few or no cash ow rights.
They are, however, not absolute defences, as they can be removed by shareholder
vote. In addition, voting and ownership ceilings, priority shares that empower cor-
porate insiders, and depositary certicates hinder outside monitoring. Compared
to dual-class shares, the verdict for these mechanisms seems less ambiguous: They
prevent individual shareholders from exerting substantial inuence or disempower
shareholders as a group, thereby granting insiders considerable protection from
both takeovers and shareholder activism. While it is sometimes claimed that this
protects minority shareholders, the lack of constraints on managerial behavior is
hard to justify theoretically. Finally, double voting shares also entrench existing
control structures and make friendly control transfers more di¢ cult, in particular
in the presence of the mandatory bid rule.
6. Concluding Remarks
The standard justication for one share - one vote is that shareholders, as residual
claimants, have the strongest interest in maximizing rm value and should therefore
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have voting rights in proportion to their equity stake (e.g., Easterbrook and Fischel,
1983, 1991; Black and Kraakman, 1996). By contrast, deviations from one share -
one vote create a wedge between nancial interest and voting power, which induces
a shareholder to pursue self-serving actions at the expense of rm value. Theory
partially conrms this view. For instance, controlling minority shareholders have
the incentives and power to divert corporate resources, or to retain control in spite
of a more e¢ cient rival.
However, theory shows that one share - one vote also comes with costs. On the
one hand, tying votes to cash ow rights raises the private cost of issuing equity. As
a result, one share - one vote may deter entrepreneurs from going public to avoid
the risk of losing control. Instead, they may resort to inferior forms of nancing,
which in turn may distort their investment strategies or inhibit rm growth. On the
other hand, tying votes to cash ow rights makes it more expensive to acquire or
exercise control. For instance, it exacerbates the free-rider problem in dispersedly
held rms. Moreover, one share - one vote discourages ownership of controlling
stakes and impairs blockholdersability to monitor management.
Hence, the primary impact of mandating one share - one vote is to disempower
large owners. To evaluate the merits of such a policy, one therefore needs to compare
not only the costs and benets of controlling minority structures but also the costs
and benets of the alternative: the managerially controlled rm. The conclusion we
draw from this comparison is that mandating one share - one vote may not improve
overall e¢ ciency, notably in systems built around large active owners. In addition,
mandating one share - one vote confronts regulators with serious implementation
problems, as rms or shareholders can resort to pyramids or derivative transactions
to separate ownership and control.
These reservations are not meant to say that there should be no limitations
on the choice of security-voting structure. Theory supports the prohibition of
midstream changes that dilute the voting rights of existing share classes. Otherwise,
rms may have di¢ culties raising capital from investors who are afraid of being
disenfranchised at some later time.
Finally, we believe that the case for regulating voting and ownership ceilings,
priority shares that empower corporate insiders, and depositary certicates is rel-
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atively clear-cut. These lock-in mechanisms prevent individual shareholders from
exerting substantial inuence or disempower shareholders as a group. This grants
managers considerable protection from both takeovers and shareholder activism.
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